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A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs—the criminal market
structure—is endogenous. As in standard models of crime, under a given gang
structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under
identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can lead to an increase
in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal
output, possibly accompanied with a fall in the price. We show that an increase
in demand can also modify the criminal market structure and can ultimately af-
fect the output and the price in a similar way.
1. Introduction
Many governments have intensiﬁed their war on organized drug trafﬁckers in
the last decades, but those efforts appear to have been unsuccessful. This ar-
ticle offers an explanation for the ineffectiveness of these policies. Endoge-
nizing the formation of gangs in a criminal market, we argue that an
increase in deterrence can make the market more competitive and can lead
to a higher output and lower prices.
Lee (1993) and Poret (2003) conﬁrm the fact that in the United States,
arrests and penalties for heroin and cocaine (including crack) drug violations
rose signiﬁcantly during the last twenty years. The U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) saw its budget increase from 0.07 billion US$ to
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 Efforts to detect criminal organizations involved in drug trafﬁcking were
intensiﬁed; and
 Effective sanctions for drug trafﬁckers were stiffened, in particular for
those belonging to large organizations (Kingpin Act).
While there was an increase in deterrence against drug consumers and pro-
ducers, the market for drugs, far from shrinking, seems to have expanded:3
 Estimated drug quantities: Studies by Kuziemko and Levitt (2001) and by
Everingham, Rydell, and Caulkins (1995) suggest that the consumption of
cocaine in the United States increased signiﬁcantly between 1980 and
1992. Possible estimates suggest that consumptionof cocaine jumped from
around 275 metric tons to around 450 metric tons over that period. In the
1990s, total cocaine production in Colombia, representing some 75% of
world production, increased by a factor of two. However, a large share of
this increase was due to the reallocation of cocaine production from
1. This information is available on the Web site of the U.S. DEA.
2. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Justice, 1997).
3. Except where we refer to a speciﬁc source, the information reported here was obtained from
the Web site of the DEA.
2 
1.55 billion US$ between 1973 and 2000, while the number of its special 
agents went from 1,470 to 4,561 over the same period.1 The number of arrests 
by the DEA almost doubled during the 1990s, and the total value of drug sei-
zures increased from 14 million US$ to 82 million US$ since 1986. Note that 
even if the DEA accounts for only part of the enforcement effort in the United 
States, similar trends can also be observed for other actors involved in drug 
enforcement. For example, Kuziemko and Levitt (2001) present evidence 
showing that in the United States, imprisonment for drug-related activities 
considerably increased during this period, while it had been relatively stable 
for other types of crime. In fact, over 80% of the increase in the federal prison 
population from 1985 to 1995 was due to drug convictions.2
More recently, governments have attempted to stiffen sanctions for orga-
nized drug trafﬁckers. In the United States, the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Des-
ignation Act (Kingpin Act) was signed by the president in December 1999 and 
became effective in June 2000. The purpose of the Kingpin Act is to deny 
access to the U.S. ﬁnancial system to signiﬁcant (i.e., large) foreign narcotics 
trafﬁckers. The Kingpin Act provides for very stiff criminal penalties for 
individuals or businesses conducting ﬁnancial or business transactions for 
designated foreign narcotics trafﬁckers. In Canada, Bill C-24, modifying 
the Canadian criminal code to account for organized crime, was adopted in 
December 2001. Under Bill C-24, an individual who is simply a member 
of a criminal organization can be prosecuted and sanctioned.
Taken together, these facts lead to the conclusion that from the early 1980s 
to recent times:
Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. Nevertheless, some DEA estimates show
an increase of up to 20% in the potential cocaine production in the Andean
region between 1991 to 2001, with most of the increase occurring in the
early years of the period. Opium production in the western hemisphere,
which constitutes about 90% of the U.S. heroin market, also increased
over the same period. Over the last ten years, heroin-related deaths rose
from 28 to 206 per year in Florida. In cities like Portland or Seattle, heroin
overdose is now more important as a cause of death than murder. Since
1995, the estimated production of Canadian cannabis has tripled. Given
the nature of the illegal sector in which drugs are traded, estimated quan-
tities could be challenged. However, overall it would be extremely dif-
ﬁcult to conclude that there was a decrease in production/consumption of
different drugs from the start of the 1980s to the mid-1990s.
 Prices:While it may be difﬁcult to estimate precisely the quantities of the
various illegal drugs in a market, information on prices is known to be
more reliable. This is because undercover agents can keep a record of
the price of each transaction they undertake. According to Caulkins
and Reuter (1998), the price of cocaine in the United States decreased
from 500 US$ to 100 US$ per gram between 1980 and 1996, and the price
of heroin has also been deﬂated by a factor of ﬁve.
To summarize, the increase in deterrence of the last decades was accompa-
nied by an increase in output and a decrease in price for most illegal drugs. This
article attempts to explain the simultaneous occurrence of these apparently
irreconciliable facts.4
Our explanation is that deterrence affects the structure of the market for
drugs. Our starting point is the assumption that the production and distribution
of illegal drugs is controlled by well-organized criminal organizations.5 As
4. In Figures 1 and 2 of their article, Kuziemko and Levitt (2001) present evidence on the
evolution, for the last 20–30 years, of the number of arrests and state prison commitments (a proxy
for the extent of deterrence), and of the price and estimated consumption of cocaine. These ﬁgures
show very clearly that indeed, deterrence increased and cocaine output increased, while cocaine
price went down. However, Kuziemko and Levitt argue that had it not been for the increase in
deterrence, cocaine price would have declined even more, due to other factors such as increase in
productivity in drug production and distribution. Our analysis states that for a given market struc-
ture, deterrence causes illegal output to fall and the price to increase, but that when accounting for
possible changes in market structure, deterrence can cause the output to increase and the price to
fall. The results of this study are perfectly consistent with Kuziemko and Levitt’s if a change in
market structure is interpreted as a factor contributing to a fall in price. Similarly to Kuziemko and
Levitt’s ﬁndings, an increase in deterrence can offset part of the decrease in price due to a change in
market structure.
5. Some well-known examples of such organizations include the Hell’s Angels and other mo-
torcycle gangs for methamphetamine in North America, and the Medellin Colombian cartel for
cocaine. No evidence can, however, conﬁrm the degree to which those cartels are (were) successful
at controlling prices. On the other hand, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) argue that drug-selling gangs
enjoy some monopoly power over their turf. Finally, as is surveyed in Poret (2003), it is standard in
the literature to model criminal organizations as enjoying some market power.
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6. See also Neher (1978), in which organized criminal organizations attempt to extort money
from some individual. This individual is viewed as a common pool of resources. Thus, and as in
the tragedy of the commons, too much extortion takes place under competition, but a lower and
efﬁcient level of extortion is undertaken under a monopoly structure. Note that as in Buchanan
(1973), Neher (1978) does not attempt to endogenize the market structure.
7. Clearly, it would be possible to design optimal deterrence policies taking this effect into
account. The current article does not do so.
8. As pointed out in Kleiman (1993), greater sales can dilute enforcement (enforcement
swamping) and consequently can create economies of scale at the industry level, leading to a
downward-sloping supply curve. Given the fact that enforcement has increased, the effect of en-
forcement swamping would need to be signiﬁcant for the price to go down after an increase in
demand. Another potential reason for industry-level economies of scale would have to do with
the network externalities in drug distribution, but such a story is not inconsistent with changes
in the market structure.
9. Of course, prices could also increase. This will depend on the various elasticities and on the
size of the shift in demand. Also note that other market structures could generate the observed
phenomena. For example, an incumbent ﬁrm with market power could reduce its price to deter
potential entrants.
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would be expected, for a given market structure (i.e., for a given number of 
criminal organizations), an increase in deterrence will reduce total output and 
increase the price of drugs. However, it may not be so when the market struc-
ture reacts to deterrence. To endogenize the market structure, we use the theory 
of coalition-formation. Then, starting from a cartel, we show how an increase 
in deterrence can lead to a splintering of the cartel. From there, we simply 
make our own the observation of Buchanan (1973):6 when more ﬁrms operate 
in an illegal good market (i.e., when the market is more competitive), the out-
put is larger and the price is lower. Thus, by increasing the number of criminal 
organizations in the market, increased deterrence leads to an increase in output 
and to a fall in prices.7
Our story bears some resemblance to the events that took place in Colombia 
after increased deterrence efforts eventually lead to the dissolution of the Cali 
and Medellin drug cartels. Interestingly, after the dissolution of the cartels, the 
number of criminal organizations involved in the production of cocaine in-
creased, and this was eventually accompanied by an increase in total produc-
tion. With between 80 and 250 organizations involved in a market that was 
previously cartelized, it could be argued that the increase in production 
was due simply to the market being made more competitive (The Economist, 
September 11, 1999).
Of course, there are alternative explanations to the simultaneous occurrence 
of the above phenomena. One of them is that there simply was an increase in 
the demand for drugs in the last decades. But it is hard to reconcile the ob-
served fall in prices with an increase in demand unless the market structure 
is endogenous.8 Our model, in which market structure is endogenous, can gen-
erate a fall in prices following an increase in demand. Indeed, when demand 
increases, there is more of an incentive to exit the cartel for any of its members. 
And, as was pointed out above, the splintering of the cartel can lead to an in-
crease in output and to a fall in prices.9
There is a small literature that has tried to explain the puzzling inefﬁciency
of the ‘‘war on drugs’’ in the 1980s. Among the possible explanations, Skott
and Jepsen (2002) propose one based on switching costs. An increase in en-
forcement leads to higher switching costs, which in turn leads to more incen-
tives for a drug seller who has market power to invest in the ‘‘marketing’’ of its
product. Such an argument explains why consumption can increase in response
to an increase in enforcement, but it cannot explain the observed reduction in
prices, and therefore can resolve the puzzle only partially. Caulkins (1993)
highlights the fact that zero-tolerance policies reduce marginal deterrence
and can lead to an overall increase in drug consumption, but again this article
restricts its attention solely to the quantity-related part of the puzzle. Poret
(2003) shows that such a counterintuitive outcome can be replicated in a model
with wholesalers (trafﬁckers) and resellers when enforcement is focused on the
wholesaler.10 However, since the number of wholesalers is ﬁxed, her argument
cannot account for the apparent increase in the number of trafﬁckers. Instead of
focusing on the potentially counterintuitive effect of enforcement on consump-
tion and prices, other studies focused on the potential impact of enforcement
on the associated cost related to illicit consumption. Miron (1999) shows that
enforcement of drug and alcohol prohibition raised the homicide rate. Property
crime, as highlighted by Benson and Rasmussen (1991) or by Benson, Kim,
Rasmussen, and Zuehlke (1992), and violence, as highlighted by Burrus
(1999), can also rise with harsher enforcement. In their survey, Miron and
Zwiebel (1995) argued again that more severe enforcement of prohibition
can raise violence and property crime. They also argued that drug-related prob-
lems (overdose and addiction) can be made more severe because drug concen-
tration may rise in response to stricter enforcement.
Other contributions are not directly related to our work but support the
assumption that the drug market is somewhat non-competitive. Fiorentini
and Peltzman (1995) have described environments in which organized crime
is likely to ﬂourish. First, they claim that organized crime is more likely to be
prevalent when there are economies of scale and monopolistic power in the
supply of some illegal good. In this article, we assume that gangs do exercise
some market power, and so the environment we consider has the required
feature. According to Fiorentini and Peltzman, another standard feature of or-
ganized crime is that gangs often exercise violence against other ﬁrms of the
legal and illegal sectors. For example, Gambetta and Reuter (1995) show that
criminal organizations can use violence to maintain their market power. In our
model, we do not introduce violence explicitly. We note that the relationship
between gang structure and violence is likely to be ambiguous. Indeed, an in-
crease in the number of gangs means that more suppliers are sharing a given
demand, and such an intensiﬁcation in competition may lead to an increase in
violence. On the other hand, a small number of gangs is likely to translate into
larger rents for each organization and, because there is more at stake, violence
may increase. Probably the most convincing argument for the presence of
10. Caulkins and Padman (1993) study a similar problem, but in an export-import context.
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2. An Overview of the Model
Consider the following economy inhabited by two types of private agents and
an authority (e.g., a government). First, there is a large number of potential
consumers for a homogenous good that can only be purchased illegally.
For simplicity, we assume that the aggregate inverse demand for this good
is linear: P ¼ b – cQ, where Q is the quantity of the illegal good, P is its price,
and b, c > 0 are parameters. Note that any downward-sloping demand would
generate qualitatively equivalent results. It is assumed that no individual can
be arrested and sanctioned for consuming the good.11 Second, there are three
identical risk-neutral criminals,12 denoted A, B, and C, which are to operate
gangs in what follows. We denote by E¼ fA, B, Cg the set of criminals. Crim-
inals will set up their businesses (gangs) to maximize their expected income.
Note that using three criminals, rather than some larger arbitrary number of
them, is mainly for ease of exposition. Indeed, as is shown in Appendix B, our
main result below (i.e., that market structure reacts to changes in deterrence
and in demand) would hold for any number of criminals.13
A criminal has two important decisions to make. The ﬁrst decision, taken
during what we call the gang formation stage, is to determine with whom he
wants to operate a gang. We assume that criminals are members of one and
only one gang. A gang is deﬁned as a nonempty subset of E denotedGj. A gang
structure is deﬁned as a partition of E and is denoted H, and the set of all
11. If we relaxed this assumption, the parameters of the demand would be affected, but not our
results.
12. Risk neutrality is assumed for simplicity and is probably the most reasonable assumption.
Indeed, risk neutrality is supported by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000), as they ﬁnd that compensations
(wages) received by Chicago gang members are low, despite the 7% annual death rates they face.
13. However, there are also some results, for example the precise path leading to the splintering
of a largemonopoly gang in Proposition 2, whichmay bemaintained only by adding further restric-
tions on the parameters of the model.
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market power in the illicit drug sector was provided by Levitt and Venkatesh 
(2000), who used actual data on a Chicago gang to show the presence of market 
power.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present an over-
view of the model and brieﬂy discuss each of the two stages (gang formation 
and gang competition) of our overall game. The gang formation stage is the 
subject of Section 3. At this stage, individuals align themselves into gangs, 
anticipating the payoffs from various gang structures. In Section 4, we analyze 
the gang competition stage in which, given a gang structure, gangs compete in 
an illegal goods market. The equilibrium of the game as well as the impact of 
deterrence and of a change in demand are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, 
we discuss how our results would change if we were to modify our assumption 
regarding the probability that gang activities are detected. We introduce the 
possibility for this probability to depend on the market share of a gang. We 
conclude in Section 7.
possible gang structures is denoted H. The process by which gangs merge or
divide into smaller gangs acts in a similar fashion as entry and exit would. We
choose to model the process this way because, as was highlighted by Levitt and
Venkatesh (2000), takeover is an important aspect of the industry. Separation
from an existing gang is at least as plausible as entry, because of the impor-
tance of speciﬁc human capital or on-hand experience in this industry.
In the second stage, the gang competition stage, the gangs will operate and
make proﬁts that will accrue to the criminals. We assume that the decisions of
gang Gj are made cooperatively by its criminal members to maximize its total
proﬁts,PGjðHÞ; from selling the illegal good. Note that proﬁts depend the gang
structure, which reﬂects the fact that other gangs affect the proﬁts of gang Gj.
We assume that the play across gangs is non-cooperative. Once the proﬁts of
gang Gj are realized, they are divided equally between its criminal members.
We denote by piðHÞ ¼ PGjðHÞ=jGjj; i 2 Gj; the expected income of criminal
i if he is a member of gang Gj, possibly with other criminals, the total number
of them in gang Gj being given by jGjj. Thus, piðHÞ is the ultimate payoff of
individual i, realized in the second stage, if gang structure H emerges in the
ﬁrst stage. Looking ahead from the ﬁrst stage to the second stage, the three
criminals will have a set of preferences (payoffs) over all possible gang struc-
tures, piðHÞ for allH 2H. Based on these preferences, criminals form gangs in
the gang formation stage, which leads to an equilibrium gang structure, say,
H*, and thus to an equilibrium payoff for each player i, piðH*Þ.
Once the gang structure has been determined, the gang competition stage
begins, during which the gang members must decide how much to produce. It
is assumed that to produce, a gang must pay a ﬁxed cost F.14 The output of
gang Gj is denoted by nj.
The authority attempts to reduce gangs’ criminal activity by sanctioning the
gang members it identiﬁes. To identify those members, it invests a in detec-
tion. Let p(a, n) be the probability that the members of a gang will be detected,
where in the case of a gang with multiple members, all of them are detected
once one of them is. It is natural to assume that more effort a by the authority
translates into a larger probability of detection, so pa  0. It could also be
argued that the probability of detection of a gang depends on its output,
but this relationship could well be positive (larger gangs are easier to inﬁltrate)
or negative (larger gangs have more at stake and invest more in avoidance
activities), so for now, pn v 0.
14. According to Levitt andVenkatesh (2000), the greatest non-wage expenditure that accounts
for 20% of the total revenue takes the form of tribute payments to central gang leadership. They
mention in their article that street gangs pay this due and are residual claimants over the proﬁts.
Corruption of the authorities and setting up routes for the transportation of drugs are other forms of
ﬁxed costs that producers outside the United States face. Note that the scale economies generated
by this ﬁxed cost are not necessary, but allowed us to simplify the analysis. In order to exercise
market power, criminals have an incentive to form a gang as large as possible. The ﬁxed cost
simply reinforces this incentive. It turns out that given the functional forms we have chosen, a pos-
itive ﬁxed cost is required for the existence of the grand monopoly gang. However, a ﬁxed cost
would not be required if other functional forms were used.
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3. The Gang Formation Stage
Starting with the set of criminals E, we model how these players might choose
to align themselves into gangs. We use the coalition formation approach of
Burbidge et al. (1997), which was itself based on that of Hart and Kurz
(1983) (see also Marceau and Myers, forthcoming).
Anticipating the gang competition stage, the players know pi(H) for all H 2
H, so they have a preference ordering over all possible gang structures. We use
these preference orderings to construct a game in strategic form for this stage.
We suppose that each criminal formulates a plan for joining partners to form
a gang. A strategy of player i is a partnership plan in which i announces the
gang to which he wants to belong. Formally, a strategy for player i is a subset
of E, or Gi, with i 2 Gi. A combination of one strategy for each player g ¼
(GA,GB,GC) is a strategy proﬁle. The set of all strategies for player i is denoted
by Gi, and G ¼ GA  GB  GC will stand for the set of all strategy proﬁles.
15. There are many possible interpretations of what we are here labeling a sanction. As is stan-
dard, a sanction could be some amount of money to be paid or some non-monetary cost (i.e., pure
utility loss) imposed on the members by the authority after detection. It could also be the oppor-
tunity cost of an illegal transaction that did not take place because of detection.
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When a gang is detected, each of its members is imposed an individual ef-
fective sanction sˆðÞ: We assume that this effective sanction15 depends on stat-
utory sanction s and, possibly, on the output of the gang n, so sˆðs; nÞ: In what 
follows, we assume that a larger statutory sanction translates into a larger ef-
fective sanction, so sˆs > 0: We also allow for the possibility that a criminal 
individual effective sanction, is increasing in the output of the gang to which 
this criminal belongs, so sˆn  0: One could argue that the case where sˆn > 0 
reﬂects laws similar to the Kingpin Act.
Because criminals are risk-neutral, we can restrict our attention to the 
expected punishment they face. Denote the expected punishment by z() 
and notice that zða; s; nÞ ¼ pða; nÞsˆðs; nÞ: Given the assumptions above, 
expected punishment should be an increasing function of detection effort a 
and of the statutory sanction s, and a function of ambiguous sign of output n. 
To simplify our analysis in what follows, we assume a precise functional 
form: z(a, s, n) ¼ kasn, where k > 0 is a parameter. Note that in this functional 
form, expected punishment is increasing in output (zn ¼ kas > 0). We think this 
reﬂects the policies that were put in place from the early 1980s until recently, 
in particular the stiffening of effective sanctions for criminals involved in 
larger gangs (Kingpin Act). Note that below, we will consider the impact 
of increases in detection effort and in the statutory sanction. It should be clear 
by now that from the point of view of criminals, both are equivalent, as both 
lead to an increase in expected punishment.
We now proceed with the analysis of the two stages, starting with the ﬁrst, 
the gang formation stage.
How a strategy proﬁle g 2 G is reconciled into a resultant gang structure is
summarized by a function, w:G/H, called the coalition structure rule, which
assigns to any g2G a unique gang structureH¼w(g). Several such rules exist,
which are discussed in Burbidge et al. (1997). But for our purposes, we have
selected the rule labeled the similarity rule. To save on notation, we assume
that w() designates the similarity rule. Now, given any i 2 E and g 2 G, let
wiðgÞ denote the gang to which i belongs in the gang structure w(g) resulting
from the proﬁle g. Then, w() is the similarity rule if for any strategy proﬁle
g 2 G, and any i 2 E, we have:
wiðgÞ ¼ f j 2 EjGi ¼ Gjg:
Thus, under the similarity rule, all players with the same partnership plan (i.e.,
an identical strategy) are in the same gang.16
The gang formation game is now well-deﬁned. The coalitional players are
the set E of criminals; the set of strategies available to each criminal i 2 E
consists of all possible partnership plans, Gi; every strategy proﬁle g induces
a gang structure w(g) through the similarity rule, and thus a payoff for each
criminal i 2 E of pi(w(g)).
The equilibrium outcome of our game will be a gang structure H* ¼ w(g*),
where g* is the equilibrium strategy proﬁle. We now wish to identify this equi-
librium strategy proﬁle. For reasons discussed in Burbidge et al. (1997), the
equilibrium concept we use in this analysis is that of the Coalition Proof Nash
Equilibrium (CPE), developed by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987),
which is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium. The concept of CPE is intended
to deal with the possibility of a group of players coordinating on a joint de-
viation if such a deviation is to make each deviating player better off. Then,
a strategy proﬁle is a CPE if no set of players, taking the strategies of its com-
plement as ﬁxed, can fashion a proﬁtable deviation for each of its members that
is itself immune to further deviations by subsets of the deviating coalition.
4. The Gang Competition Stage
Various equilibrium outcomes can emerge from the ﬁrst stage. When the equi-
librium outcome is the grand gang H* ¼ ffA, B, Cgg, this single gang will act
as a monopoly in the illegal good market. But if H* contains two gangs (i.e., if
H* ¼ ffA, Bg, fCgg, or if H* ¼ ffA, Cg, fBgg, or if H* ¼ ffAg, fB, Cgg),
these will compete as a duopoly. Finally, if the outcome is one with three sin-
gleton gangs (H* ¼ ffAg, fBg, fCgg), they will compete as a triopoly. We
16. For example, in a game with a set of three players fA, B, Cg, suppose that the players have
the following strategy proﬁle: g ¼ ðGA ¼ fA;B;Cg;GB ¼ fB;Cg;GC ¼ fB;CgÞ: Then, the sim-
ilarity rule leads to a duopoly gang structure in which A is alone while B andC are together:w(g)¼
ffAg, fB, Cgg. Another example takes place in a world with four players fA, B, C, Dg. Suppose
the players have the following strategy proﬁle: g ¼ ðGA ¼ fA;B;Cg;GB ¼ fB;C;Dg;
GC ¼ fB;C;Dg;GD ¼ fA;B;C;DgÞ: Then, the similarity rule leads to a triopoly gang structure
in which A is alone, B and C are together, and D is alone: w(g) ¼ ffAg, fB, Cg, fDgg. Note that
there is a unique g, denoted gm, which leads to the formation of the grand gang: gm ¼ fE, E, Eg.
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4.1 Monopoly




ðb cnÞn F  3kans:
From the ﬁrst-order condition, the solution to this problem is nm ¼ (b – 3kas)/
2c. Clearly, an increase in either the statutory sanction or detection effort leads
to a decrease in production. After sharing, the proﬁts for each member are
pmi ¼ ðb 3kasÞ2=12c F=3; which are also decreasing with the statutory
sanction and with detection effort.
4.2 Duopoly
When the equilibrium structure entails two gangs, one is necessarily a singleton
gang and the other a doubleton gang. The two gangs compete as a duopoly. We
denote by ns and nd the production of the singleton and doubleton gangs, re-
spectively. The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd the reaction functions for each gang. For the
singleton gang, the problem to solve is
max
n
½b cðnþ ndÞn F  kans;
while for the doubleton gang, it is
max
n
½b cðns þ nÞn F  2kans:
Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields nd ¼ (b – 3kas)/3c and ns ¼ b/3c.
Output is decreasing in the statutory sanction and in detection effort for the
doubleton gang, but not for the singleton gang. However, because the singleton
gang faces a smaller total expected punishment, it produces more. The proﬁts
for each of the criminal members of the doubleton gang are pdi ¼
ðb 3kasÞ2=18c F=2; while the proﬁts for each criminal member of the
singleton gang are psi ¼ b2=9c F: Again, the proﬁts per member are de-
creasing in the statutory sanction and in detection effort for the doubleton
gang, but not for the singleton gang.
4.3 Triopoly
The last possible gang structure is one with three singleton gangs. The three
gangs compete as a triopoly. Let ntj denote the output of gang Gj. The problem
of the criminal of gang Gi; i 6¼ k; ‘; is
max
n
½b cðnþ ntk þ nt‘Þn F  kans:
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examine each of these in turn. Note that in all cases, we assume that deterrence 
cannot fully deter production; in other words, we assume that for each gang 
structure, expected punishment cannot be chosen so as to make it optimal for 
ﬁrms to stop producing.
Solving for the Nash equilibrium and imposing symmetry so that ntj ¼ nt;"j;
we ﬁnd that nt¼ (b – kas)/4c, which is decreasing in the statutory sanction and
in detection effort. The per criminal proﬁts are pti ¼ ðb kasÞ2=16c F;
which are also decreasing in the statutory sanction and in detection effort.
4.4 Summary
In Table 1, we present a summary of the payoffs for each criminal for the three
types of gang structures. Examination of this table reveals forcefully that with-
out a theory of coalition formation, it would be impossible to identify the equi-
librium gang structure.
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium of the overall game and pres-
ent our results regarding the impact of an increase in expected punishment or of
a shift in demand.
5. Equilibrium
Before turning to the description of the equilibrium, we ﬁrst present a re-
sult that is in accord with conventional wisdom. Note that all proofs are in
Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Given a gang structure, an increase in expected punishment
(detection effort a or statutory sanction s) leads to a decrease in the illegal good
total output and to an increase in its price. As for an increase in the demand
parameter b given a gang structure, it leads to an increase in both the illegal
good total output and in its price.
The important requirement for Proposition 1 to hold is that the gang struc-
ture remains the same after expected punishment or demand has increased. As
we will now show, this is not guaranteed.
We now turn to a description of the equilibrium of the overall game. Recall
that the model of coalition formation used in this article is that of Burbidge
et al. (1997), itself based on that of Hart and Kurz (1983). An alternative ap-
proach on coalition formation has been developed in Ray and Vohra (1999).
Each approach presents some advantages. For example, Ray and Vohra’s
(1999) approach is more complex (a cost), but it endogenizes both the division
of a coalition’s resources and the coalition structure rule (a beneﬁt), which















a) If F > F > F˜; then the equilibrium outcome is the grand gang;
b) If F > F > F˜; then the equilibrium outcome is a duopoly gang structure;
and
c) If F > F˜ > F; then the equilibrium outcome is a triopoly gang structure.
Thus, depending on the level of the ﬁxed cost F relative to two critical lev-
els, various equilibrium gang structures can obtain.17
The following result also obtains.
Lemma 2. For b large enough relative to kas, the critical levels F and F˜ are
increasing in expected punishment (detection effort a or statutory sanction s).
Similarly, critical levels F and F˜ are both increasing in the demand parameter b.
For the rest of this article, we assume that b is large enough so that Lemma 2
holds.18 Then, combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we can show our main result:
Proposition 2. Starting from an equilibrium gang structure entailing the
grand gang, increasing expected punishment (detection effort a or statutory
sanction s) will eventually lead to a switch to a duopoly gang structure; further
increases in expected punishment will lead to a switch to a triopoly gang struc-
ture. An increase in the demand parameter b has a similar impact.
Thus, the gang structure responds to deterrence and to shifts in demand.19
There are factors that make a breakup of the gang structure more likely. Clearly,
the larger the size of the change in expected punishment, the more likely the
17. As is shown in Part A of the Appendix, a given equilibrium outcome can be the result of
several equilibrium strategy proﬁles.
18. The condition on b is only required to ensure that @F˜=@a > 0 and @F˜=@s > 0: This implies
that the results in Proposition 2 concerning the transition from the grand gang to a duopoly gang
structure hold for any value of b.
19. This key element of Proposition 2 is extended to the case of an arbitrary large number m of
criminals in Part B of the Appendix.
12 
are exogenous in the current study. In principle, the equilibria under these two 
approaches could differ. However, in the language of Ray and Vohra (1999), 
the game considered here generates a symmetric partition function. In that 
case, applying Theorem 3.5 of Ray and Vohra (1999) yields the same equi-
librium outcome as that described in our Lemma 1 (immediately below). The 
two approaches are therefore consistent in the speciﬁc model used here.
Lemma 1. There exists two critical levels of the ﬁxed cost, denoted F and F˜; 
with
gang structure will respond.20 Also, a larger demand for the illegal good (as
measured by a larger b and/or a smaller c) magniﬁes the response of the gang
structure to expected punishment. Indeed, it is possible to show that starting
from a monopoly, a given increase in expected punishment is more likely to
induce a breakup of the monopoly when the demand is larger.21
Ultimately, an authority who would like to design an optimal deterrence
policy should take the response of the gang structure into account. For exam-
ple, if such an authority would like to minimize the illegal good total output, it
would certainly beneﬁt from understanding the following:
Corollary to Proposition 2. Starting from an equilibrium gang structure en-
tailing the grand gang, increasing expected punishment (detection effort a or stat-
utory sanction s) can lead to an increase in the illegal good total output and
a reduction in its price.Also, starting fromanequilibriumgang structure entailing
the grand gang, an increase in the demand parameter b leads to an increase in the
illegal good total output, and may translate into a reduction in its price.
This result contradicts conventional wisdom. It says that an increase in
expected punishment can lead to more crime (as measured by output). This,
of course, is due to the fact that by increasing expected punishment, a monop-
oly is broken and the illegal good market is made more competitive. And as is
well known, more competition implies larger quantities.
In Figures 1a and 1b, we have depicted the relationship between total output
and effort in detection (equivalent ﬁgures can be drawn with respect to the
Figure 1a. Output as a Function of Detection Effort.
20. This is because, for a given F, a larger change in a leads to a larger change in F and F˜;
making it more likely that F will switch from being smaller than F (resp. F˜) to being larger than F
(resp. F˜).
21. It can be shown that @2F=@a@b > 0 and @2F=@a@c < 0:
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statutory sanction). In these ﬁgures, a and ~a denote the levels of detection
effort such that F equals F and F˜; respectively. Thus, for a < a (low detection
effort), the equilibrium gang structure is a monopoly; for a  a < ~a (medium
detection effort), it is a duopoly; and for a  ~a (high detection effort), it is
a triopoly. In both ﬁgures, it can be noted that for a given gang structure, out-
put declines with detection effort, but also that output jumps when the equi-
librium gang structure changes. Overall, and as in Figure 1b, a breakup in the
gang structure following an increase in detection effort may well lead to a
level of output higher than any of those observed for lower levels of detection
effort.
In Figure 2, the price increases when detection effort increases, as long as
the market structure remains the same. This reﬂects the fact that for all gangs
in a gang structure, an increase in detection effort is equivalent to an increase in
their costs, which translates into a higher price. However, if the increase in
detection effort triggers a splintering of the gang structure, the increased com-
petition leads to an abrupt fall in the price. The overall impact on prices is
generally ambiguous.22
One could argue that an increase in demand explains the increase in the
production of drugs observed in the last decades. But, in a standard model with
a ﬁxed market structure, this potential explanation is unsatisfactory because it
Figure 1b. Output as a Function of Detection Effort.
22. Since the price does not necessarily fall, our model can also be made consistent with the
view of Kuziemko and Levitt (2001), according to which prices would have fallen by more had it
not been for increased deterrence.
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fails to generate the reduction in prices that was also observed.23 In our model,
however, an increase in the demand parameter b can generate a splintering of
the gang structure, and this can lead to a fall in prices. By staying with the
grand gang, a criminal gets his share of monopoly proﬁts, but by being the
ﬁrst to break away, he gets duopoly proﬁts he does not have to share. As
can be shown, for some size of demand, the incentive to break away comes
to dominate that to stay with the grand gang. Note that by generating poten-
tially lower prices for larger markets, our model is consistent with Caulkins
(1995), which provides empirical evidence according to which larger markets
(cities) have lower drug prices.
The next ﬁgures depict the relationship between the demand parameter b,
output (Figure 3), and price (Figure 4). In these ﬁgures, the level of expected
punishment is set at some arbitrary ﬁxed level, and b and ~b denote the levels of
the demand parameter b such that F equals F and F˜; respectively. For b < b
(low demand), the equilibrium gang structure is a monopoly; for b  b < ~b
(medium demand), it is a duopoly; and for b  ~b (high demand), it is a triopoly.
In Figure 3, output rises with demand for a given gang structure, and output
jumps up when the equilibrium gang structure is made more competitive.
Overall, output unambiguously rises as demand rises. On the other hand,
the impact on the price of an increase in demand is similar to that produced
by an increase in expected punishment. The price increases when demand
rises, as long as the gang structure remains constant. But when the market
becomes sufﬁciently large (i.e., when the demand is large enough), a break-
down in the gang structure takes place. In such a case, the price falls abruptly.
Figure 2. Price as a Function of Detection Effort.
23. Again, as was mentioned earlier, a model with entry deterrence could possibly generate
a fall in the price.
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To summarize, our model can explain the increase in production and the fall
in prices of several drugs in the last decades, whether these changes were due
to an increase in deterrence or to an increase in demand.
6. Market Share and Detection
The probability that the activities of a gang will be detected is an important
element of the preceding analysis. We argued that expected punishment could
Figure 3. Output as a Function of Demand Size.
Figure 4. Price as a Function of Demand Size.
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increase for larger gangs (zn > 0) when the probability of detection is not af-
fected by output (pn ¼ 0) but when effective sanction increases with output
ðsˆn > 0Þ: An alternative view is simply that the probability of detection is an
increasing function of the absolute level of output (pn > 0), and that effective
sanctions are not affected by output ðsˆn ¼ 0Þ:24 But in that case, for a given
level of detection effort a, if each gangs double their output, they each double
the probability that they are apprehended. This may be viewed as unsatisfac-
tory when detection effort is ﬁxed.
Aswas suggested to us by a referee, a possiblymore satisfactory alternative is
to suppose that the probability of detection is a function ofmarket share. Further
to conforming with intuition, such a speciﬁcation also introduces interesting
externalities between gangs: when a gang increases its output, it increases
its market share and its probability of detection, but it also reduces the market
share of other gangs and their probability of detection. We now turn to analyz-
ing such a world for the particular case in which there are only two criminals.
If there are only two criminals, only two gang structures are possible: a two-
member monopoly gang or a two singleton gangs duopoly. Assume that when
apprehended, the effective sanction for each criminal belonging to a gang pro-
ducing n units of output is sˆðs; nÞ ¼ ns; so that the effective sanction reﬂects
laws similar to the Kingpin Act. To simplify further, assume that s¼ 1, so that
sˆ ¼ n: We will compare results in two cases.
a. Detection independent of output. To render meaningful the comparison
with Case b below, we assume that detection effort a is either fully al-
located to detecting the monopoly, or equally split in half to detect each
gang in the case of a duopoly. Thus, p(a, n) ¼ a for a monopoly, and
p(a, n) ¼ a/2 for each gang in the case of a duopoly. Expected punish-
ment is then z(a, s, n) ¼ an for the monopoly, and z(a, s, n) ¼ an/2 for
each gang in a duopoly.
b. Detection depends on market share. In this case, we assume that the prob-
ability of gang i producing niwhile gang j produces nj is p(a, ni, nj)¼ ani/
(niþ nj). Thus, the larger themarket share of i, the larger its probability of
detection. Note that expected punishment is now z(a,s,ni,nj) ¼ ani2/
(ni þ nj).
6.1 Detection Independent of Output
We use subscript I to identify equilibrium quantities in this case. When the two
criminals operate together in a monopoly, they solve the following problem:
max
n
ðb cnÞn F  2an:
The solution to this problem is nmI ¼ ðb 2aÞ=2c; and the proﬁts for each
member are pmI ;i ¼ ðb 2aÞ2=8c F=2: To ensure positive monopoly output,
we impose that b > 2a.




½b cðnþ n#Þn F  an
2
:
Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields nsI ¼ ½b ða=2Þ=3c: The proﬁts for
the criminal of each singleton gang are psI ;i ¼ ½b ða=2Þ2=9c F:
6.2 Detection Depends on Market Share
We use subscript M to identify equilibrium quantities in this case. When the
two criminals operate together in a monopoly, because market share is unity,
the problem they solve is identical to that of a monopoly in Case a. Thus,
nmM ¼ ðb 2aÞ=2c and the proﬁts for each member are pmM ;i ¼ ðb 2aÞ2=
8c F=2:
In the case of a duopoly, the problem to solve for each singleton gang is
max
n
½b cðnþ n#Þn F  a n
2
nþ n#:
Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields nsM ¼ ½b ð3a=4Þ=3c: The proﬁts for
the criminal of each singleton gang are psM ;i ¼ b½b ð3a=4Þ=9c F:
6.3 Comparison
The ﬁrst point to note is that under a duopoly, output per gang is smaller when
detection depends on market share than when it does not: nsM < n
s
I : The in-
tuition is clear: each gang takes into account the fact that having a larger mar-
ket share increases the probability of detection, so each gang reduces its output.
More interestingly, provided b> 2a (which we require above to ensure pos-
itive monopoly output), proﬁts per gang (or per criminal) are larger when de-
tection depends on market share than when it does not: psM ;i > p
s
I ;i: The
intuition for this result is that the non-cooperative duopoly total output is
too large relative to the joint proﬁt maximizing output (i.e., the monopoly out-
put). The fact that detection depends on market share disciplines each gang,
leading them to reduce output and thereby increasing proﬁts.
As before, there is a level of the ﬁxed cost Fˆr in regime r ¼ I,M such that if
F > Fˆr; then the equilibrium gang structure is the monopoly, while if F < Fˆr;
then the equilibrium gang structure is the duopoly. These critical levels of the
ﬁxed cost are














It follows from simple manipulations that FˆM > FˆI : Thus, a monopoly gang
structure is more likely to splinter after an increase in detection effort a or
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In the case of a duopoly, each gang is a singleton. For each singleton gang, 
the problem to solve is
in demand b when detection depends on market share than when it does not.
The intuition, of course, is that proﬁts are larger when detection depends on
market share, and this makes more attractive the unilateral deviation leading to
a duopoly.
Thus, the main point of this article (i.e., that criminal market structure reacts
to deterrence or to demand) is maintained in an environment in which detec-
tion depends on market share.
7. Conclusion
Previous studies of criminal gangs have assumed a ﬁxed market (or gang)
structure. This article’s contribution has been to provide a framework in which
gang structure is endogenous, thereby allowing for interesting and possibly
counterintuitive phenomena. Our framework may, for example, provide an ex-
planation for the failure of the ‘‘war on drugs’’ intensiﬁed in the 1980s under
the Reagan administration. If market structure is ﬁxed, more deterrence clearly
leads to a reduction in criminal output. But as is shown in our analysis, when
the gang structure responds to deterrence, more deterrence may lead to an in-
crease in criminal output if it makes the market more competitive. Such a phe-
nomenon was shown to possibly obtain in an oligopolistic market of the type
we observe in the real world (e.g., cocaine or heroin markets). The failures of
several wars on drugs may be explained by such a turn of events.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The grand gang produces nm, which is decreasing in
a, and the price is Pm¼ b – cnm, which is increasing with a. Under the duopoly
structure, total output is ns þ nd, which decreases with a, while the price Pd ¼
b – c(nd þ ns) is increasing with a. Finally, total output is 3nt under a triopoly
structure, and this is also decreasing in a; the price Pt ¼ b – c3nt is increasing
with a. The same analysis applies for changes in s.
A similar analysis can be undertaken with respect to changes in the demand
parameter b. The grand gang produces nm, which is increasing in b, and the
price is Pm¼ b – cnm, which is increasing with b. Under the duopoly structure,
total output is nsþ nd, which increases with b, and the price Pd¼ b – c(ndþ ns)
is increasing with b. Finally, total output is 3nt under a triopoly structure,
which is also increasing in b, and the price Pt ¼ b – c3nt is increasing
with b. n
Proof of Lemma 1. F is the ﬁxed cost such that pmi ¼ psi ;while F˜ is such that













which, after some manipulations, reduces to b2 þ 3kas(4b – 3kas) > 0. This
holds since nm ¼ (b – 3kas)/2c > 0.
Next, to prove parts a), b), and c), consider the relative payoffs for the three
possible levels of F.
a) F > F > F˜ (Table A.1)
From the strategy proﬁle gm ¼ (E, E, E), with E ¼ fA, B, Cg (i.e., all crim-
inals want to be in a grand gang), there is no proﬁtable deviation, as the payoffs
in the ﬁrst row (the equilibrium outcome for gm) dominate those of the two
other rows. Therefore, gm is a CPE.
From any g that leads to the gang structures in rows 2 or 3, there are always
proﬁtable and credible deviations by the subset of players with Gi 6¼ E to Gi ¼
E. They are proﬁtable (see Table A.1), and credibility is established by gm
being CPE. Therefore, the unique CPE is gm, and the unique gang structure
is the grand gang.
b) F > F > F˜ (Table A.2)
From the strategy proﬁle gm, there is a proﬁtable unilateral, and therefore
credible deviation, by C, to GC ¼ fCg. From any g that leads to the triopoly
gang structure ffAg, fBg, fCgg, there is at most one player with strategy E. If
there is one player with strategy E, then this player, say A, and one of the other
Table A.2. Ranking of Payoffs when F > F > F˜
Table A.1. Ranking of Payoffs when F > F > F˜
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two, say B (as in Table A.1), have a proﬁtable deviation to GA¼ GB¼ fA, Bg.
This deviation is also credible, as there are no further proﬁtable deviations for
them (recall GC 6¼ E). If no player has strategy E, then any two players, say
A and B, have a proﬁtable and credible deviation to GA ¼ GB ¼ fA, Bg.
Therefore, if there is a CPE gang structure, it must be the duopoly gang
structure. The proﬁle g ¼ (fA, Bg, fA, Bg, fCg) is immune to unilateral devi-
ations, as they are not proﬁtable. As for a joint deviation by A and B to E, it
would have no effect because under the similarity rule, the equilibrium gang
structure would not change. Thus, g ¼ (fA, Bg, fA, Bg, fCg) is CPE, as are
other proﬁles [e.g., g#¼ (fA, Bg, fA, Bg, fB, Cg)] leading to the duopoly gang
structure. Thus, the unique CPE gang structure is the duopoly.
c) F > F˜ > F (Table A.3)
From the strategy proﬁle gm, there is a proﬁtable unilateral and therefore
credible deviation, by C, to GC ¼ fCg. From any g that leads to the duopoly
gang structure ffA,Bg, fCgg, there are proﬁtable unilateral and therefore cred-
ible deviations, by A to GA ¼ fAg, and by B to GB ¼ fBg.
Therefore, if there is a CPE gang structure, it must be the triopoly gang
structure. The proﬁle g ¼ (fAg, fBg, fCg) is immune to unilateral deviations
and to two-player deviations because they are not proﬁtable. A joint deviation
by all players to E is not credible as C would have an incentive to further de-
viate to GC ¼ fCg. Thus, g ¼ (fAg, fBg, fCg) is CPE, as are other proﬁles
[e.g., g#¼ (fA, Bg, fBg, fCg)] leading to the triopoly gang structure. Thus, the
unique CPE gang structure is the triopoly. n
Proof of Lemma 2. The result is obtained by differentiating F and F˜ with
respect to a. First, @F=@a ¼ 6ksðb 3kasÞ=8c; which is positive since nm ¼
ðb 3kasÞ=2c > 0. Second, note that @F˜=@a ¼ 2ksf½ðb 3kasÞ=3c 
½ðb kasÞ=8cg: Routine manipulations show that @F˜=@a > 0 if b >
4.2kas, i.e., @F˜=@a > 0 for b large enough relative to kas. The same analysis
applies for changes in s.
Similarly, we need to differentiate F and F˜with respect to b. First, @F=@b ¼
ðbþ 9kasÞ=12c; which is positive. Second, note that @F˜=@b ¼ f½ðbþ
15kasÞ=36c; which is positive. n
Table A.3. Ranking of Payoffs when F > F˜ > F
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F˜Appendix B: Generalization to the Case of m Criminals
In the main text, we consider a simpliﬁed world in which there are only three
criminals who have to choose with whom they want to operate a gang. In that
context, Proposition 2 states that gang structure may be affected in a precise
way by expected punishment and by shifts in demand.
We here extend the key element of Proposition 2 (i.e., that market structure
reacts to changes in expected punishment or in demand) to the case in which
there is an arbitrarily large number m of criminals. To make our point, we
assume that initially, them criminals have decided to operate together as a mo-
nopoly. The analysis below shows that when expected punishment increases
(the equivalent holds for shifts in demand), a point will come where it will pay
for one criminal (any of them criminals, as they are all identical and proﬁts are
shared equally) to leave the grand monopoly gang and to start operating on his
own, thereby creating a duopoly gang structure with a large gang of (m – 1)
criminals and a small gang with a single criminal.
Extending the model presented in the main text, consider ﬁrst the problem of
m criminals operating as a monopoly:
max
n
ðb cnÞn F  mkans:
From the ﬁrst-order condition, the solution to this problem is nm ¼ (b – mkas)/
2c. After sharing, the proﬁts for each member of the gang are pmi ¼
ðb mkasÞ2=4mc F=m:
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Proof of Proposition 2. Starting from F > F > F˜; and by Lemma 2, in-
creasing a or s will eventually lead to F > F > F˜: Further increases will 
then lead to F > F˜ > F: That the gang structure changes then follows from 
Lemma 1. The same analysis is valid for an increase in b. n
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 2. From Proposition 2, a marginal in-
crease in a when F ¼ F will induce a switch from the grand gang to the du-
opoly gang structure. Output will therefore go from nm ¼ (b – 3kas)/2c to ns þ 
nd ¼ (2b – 3kas)/3c > nm, and price will go from Pm ¼ (b þ 3kas)/2 to Pd ¼ 
(b þ kas)/3 < Pm. Also, an increase in a when F ¼ will induce a switch 
from the duopoly to the triopoly gang structure. Output will therefore go from 
ns þ nd ¼ (2b – 3kas)/3c to 3nt ¼ 3(b – kas)/4c > ns þ nd, and price will go 
from Pd ¼ (b þ kas)/3 to Pt ¼ (b þ kas)/4 < Pd. The same analysis applies for 
changes in s.
Also from Proposition 2, a marginal increase in b when F ¼ F will induce 
a switch from the grand gang to the duopoly gang structure. Output will there-
fore go from nm ¼ (b – 3kas)/2c to ns þ nd ¼ (2b – 3kas)/3c > nm, and price 
will go from Pm ¼ (b þ 3kas)/2 to Pd ¼ (b þ kas)/3 < Pm. Also, an increase 
in b when F ¼ F˜ will induce a switch from the duopoly to the triopoly gang 
structure. Output will therefore go from ns þ nd ¼ (2b – 3kas)/3c to 3nt ¼ 
3(b – kas)/4c > ns þ nd, and price will go from Pd ¼ (b þ kas)/3 to Pt ¼ 
(b þ kas)/4 < Pd. n
Consider now the duopoly gang structure in which one is a singleton gang
and the other an (m – 1)-member gang. Denote by ns and n‘ the production of
the singleton and of the (m – 1)-member gangs, respectively. The ﬁrst step is to




½b cðnþ n‘Þn F  kans;
while for the (m – 1)-member gang, it is
max
n
½b cðns þ nÞn F  ðm 1Þkans:
Solving for the Nash equilibrium levels of output yields n‘ ¼ [b þ (3 –
2m)kas]=3c and ns ¼ [b – (3 – m)kas]=3c. The proﬁts for the criminal of
the singleton gang are then psi ¼ ½b ð3 mÞkas2=9c F:
Our claim is that starting from the monopoly gang structure (with psi < p
m
i ),
an increase in expected punishment or shifts in demand may alter the environ-
ment and make it attractive for any criminal to leave the grand monopoly gang
ðpsi > pmi Þ: Formally, the following holds:
Lemma 1A. There exists a critical level of the ﬁxed cost, denoted F˘; with







such that if F < F˘; then the equilibrium outcome is not the monopoly gang
structure.
Proof of Lemma 1A. F˘ is the ﬁxed cost such that pmi ¼ psi : Suppose that
initially, the grand monopoly gang is an equilibrium (it must then be that
pmi > p
s
i ). Simple manipulations show that if the environment becomes such
that F < F˘; then psi > p
m
i and there is a proﬁtable unilateral (and therefore
credible) deviation: some criminal (any of them criminals) can leave the grand
monopoly gang to operate on his own and be better off. Therefore, the grand
monopoly gang cannot be an equilibrium gang structure if F < F˘: n
Further, note that F˘ is increasing in a, s, and b. Then, if those parameters are
such that F > F˘ initially, an increase in any of those parameters will increase F˘
and will eventually reverse the inequality, making it impossible for the grand
monopoly gang to remain an equilibrium.
Note that showing that the splintering of the monopoly gang structure would
eventually happen is sufﬁcient to make our point. However, we do not claim,
as in Proposition 2, that following an increase in expected punishment or in
demand, the ﬁrst splintering will necessarily be from the monopoly to an fm –
1, 1g duopoly structure. In fact, the splintering could be from the monopoly to
other duopoly structures, e.g., to an fm – m#, m#g duopoly structure with 0 <
m#<m, wherem# criminals make a joint deviation. In fact, the ﬁrst splintering
 23
References
Benson, B. L., and D. W. Rasmussen. 1991. ‘‘The Relationship Between Illicit Drug Enforcement
Policy and Property Crimes,’’ 9 Contemporary Economic Policy 106–15.
Benson, B. L., I. Kim, D. W. Rasmussen, and T. W. Zuehlke. 1992. ‘‘Is Property Crime Caused by
Drug Use or by Drug Enforcement Policy,’’ 24 Applied Economics 679–92.
Bernheim, D., B. Peleg, and M. D. Whinston. 1987. ‘‘Coalition–Proof Nash Equilibrium 1.
Concepts,’’ 42 Journal of Economic Theory 1–12.
Buchanan, J. 1973. ‘‘A Defense of Organized Crime,’’ in S. Rottenberg, ed., The Economics Of
Crime and Punishment. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
Burbidge, J. B., J. DePater, G. M. Myers, and A. Sengupta. 1997. ‘‘A Coalition Formation Ap-
proach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs,’’ 87 American Economic Review 940–56.
Burrus, R. T. 1999. ‘‘Do Efforts to Reduce the Supply of Illicit Drugs Increase Turf War Violence?
A Theoretical Analysis,’’ 23 Journal of Economics and Finance 465–93.
Caulkins, J. P. 1993. ‘‘Zero-Tolerance Policies: Do they Inhibit or Stimulate Illicit Drug Consump-
tion?,’’ 39 Management Science 458–76.
Caulkins, J. P. 1995. ‘‘Domestic Geographic Variation in Illicit Drug Prices,’’ 37 Journal of Urban
Economics 38–56.
Caulkins, J. P., and R. Padman. 1993. ‘‘Interdiction’s Impact on the Structure and Behavior of the
Export-Impost Sector for Illicit Drugs,’’ 37 Zeitschrift fur Operations Research 207–24.
Caulkins, J. P., and P. Reuter. 1998. ‘‘What Price Data Tell Us About DrugMarkets,’’ 28 Journal of
Drug Issues 593–612.
Everingham, S. M., C. P. Rydell, and J. P. Caulkins. 1995. ‘‘Cocaine Consumption in the United
States: Estimating Past Trends and Future Scenarios,’’ 29 Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
305–14.
Fiorentini, G., and S. Peltzman. 1995. ‘‘Introduction,’’ in G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman, eds., The
Economics Of Organised Crime. Stanford: Cambridge University Press.
Gambetta, D., and P. Reuter. 1995. ‘‘Conspiracy Among the Many: The Maﬁa in Legitimate In-
dustries,’’ in G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman, eds., The Economics Of Organised Crime. Stanford:
Cambridge University Press.
Hart, S., and M. Kurz. 1983. ‘‘Endogenous Formation of Coalitions,’’ 51 Econometrica 1047–64.
Kleiman, M. A. 1993. ‘‘Enforcement Swamping: A Positive-Feedback Mechanism in Rates of
Illicit Activity,’’ 17 Mathematical and Computer Modeling 65–75.
Kuziemko, I., and S. D. Levitt. 2001. ‘‘An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders,’’
NBER Working Paper 8489.
Lee,L.W. 1993. ‘‘WouldHarassingDrugUsersWork?,’’ 101 Journal ofPoliticalEconomy939–61.
Levitt, S. D., and S. A. Venkatesh. 2000. ‘‘An Economic Analysis of Drug-Selling Gang’s
Finances,’’ 115 Quarterly Journal of Economics 755–89.
Marceau, N., and G. Myers. Forthcoming. ‘‘On the Early Holocene: From Foraging to Early
Agriculture,’’ Economic Journal.
24 
could be from the monopoly to a large variety of gang structures involving an 
arbitrary number of gangs. Thus, the precise path in which splintering takes 
place when there are three players may not necessarily generalize to the case of 
m players. Finally, note that when the number of criminals increases, the po-
tential number of gangs also increases. Clearly, when the number of gangs is 
large, a small increase in their number should have only a small impact on 
output and prices. However, a counterbalancing factor is that a given change 
in expected punishment (or a given shift in demand) could have a larger impact 
on the number of operating gangs when their number is large than when their 
number is small.
Miron, J. A. 1999. ‘‘Violence and the U.S. Prohibitions of Drugs and Alcohol,’’ 1 American Law
and Economics Review 78–114.
Miron, J. A., and J. Zwiebel. 1995. ‘‘The Economic Case Against Drug Prohibitions,’’ 9 Journal of
Economic Perspectives 175–72.
Neher, P. A. 1978. ‘‘The Pure Theory of Muggery,’’ 68 American Economic Review 437–45.
Poret, S. 2003. ‘‘Paradoxical Effects of Law Enforcement Policies: The Case of Illicit Drug
Market,’’ 22 International Review of Law and Economics 465–93.
Ray, D., and R. Vohra. 1999. ‘‘A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures,’’ 26 Games and
Economic Behavior 286–336.
Skott, P., and G. T. Jepsen. 2002. ‘‘Paradoxical Effects of Drug Policy in a Model with Imperfect
Competition and Switching Cost,’’ 48 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 335–54.
The Economist. 1999. ‘‘A New Class of Trafﬁcker,’’ Volume 352, Issue 8136 (September 11,
page 38).
25
